Dual Nationality, Dominant Nationality and Federal
Diversity Jurisdiction by unknown
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 38 | Issue 1 Article 7
Winter 1-1-1981
Dual Nationality, Dominant Nationality and
Federal Diversity Jurisdiction
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School of
Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Dual Nationality, Dominant Nationality and Federal Diversity Jurisdiction, 38 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 77
(1981), https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol38/iss1/7
NOTES
DUAL NATIONALITY, DOMINANT NATIONALITY
AND FEDERAL DIVERSITY JURISDICTION
A dual national is a citizen of two or more nations.1 Dual nationality
exists because sovereign nations use different methods to confer nation-
ality.2 A person may become a dual national at birth,' or at any time
I Under dual nationality theory, an individual may simultaneously possess the rights
and responsibilities of citizenship in more than one nation. See Kawakita v. United States,
343 U.S. 717, 734 (1952).
Nationality and citizenship are often used synonomously and refer to a person's rela-
tionship to a particular state. The term nationality, in its most proper use, is more inclusive
than the term citizenship. Citizens possess the entire spectrum of civil and political rights
allowed by the state. A national, however, may be an individual who does not have the full
rights of citizenship, but who owes allegiance to the state and who is entitled to protection
by the state. 3 G.H. HACKWORTH, DIGEST ON INTERNATIONAL LAW § 220 (1942) [hereinafter
cited as HACKWORTH]; see 8 U.S.C. § 1481(c) (1976); Note, Towards a Solution of the Dual Na-
tionality Problem, 23 TEMP. L.Q. 399, 399 (1950) [hereinafter cited as A Solution of the Dual
Nationality Problem].
I Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717, 734 (1952).
Under the doctrine of jus soli, nationality is based on the place of birth. Under the doc-
trine of jus sanguinis, nationality is based upon descent. See Flournoy, Dual Nationality
and Election, 30 YALE L.J. 545, 546 (1921) [hereinafter cited as Flournoy]; Orfield, The Legal
Effects of Dual Nationality, 17 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 427, 432-33 (1949) [hereinafter cited as
Orfield]; Scott, Nationality: Jus Soli or Jus Sanguinis, 24 AM. J. OF INT'L L. 58, 59-63 (1930)
[hereinafter cited as Scott]; Note, Some Problems of Dual Nationality, 28 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
63, 64 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Problems of Dual Nationality]; HACKWORTH, supra note 1,
§§ 221, 222. Jus soli is a newer doctrine than jus sanguinis and probably originated in feudal
times when a person born within a territory owed fealty to the lord. See Flournoy, supra at
546. Jus sanguinis may have originated in ancient times when tribal bloodlines were more
important than the place of birth. Id.
Originally, the Constitution contained the words "natural born citizen" but did not set
forth guidelines to confer citizenship. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4; Flournoy, supra, at
550-54 (citing Inglis v. Trustees of Sailors Snug Harbor, 8 U.S. (3 Pet.) 99, 106 (1810)); Mur-
ray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 65-68 (1804). The fourteenth amend-
ment to the Constitution incorporates the doctrine of jus soli and, therefore, every person
born in the United States is an American citizen. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see
HACKWORTH. supra note 1, § 221. The United States also confers nationality based on des-
cent. See Flournoy, supra, at 550-54; HACKWORTH, supra note 1, § 222. Therefore, every child
born outside the territorial limits of the United States to parents, one of whom is an
American citizen, acquires American citizenship. HACKWORTH, supra note 1, § 222.
Domestic law determines nationality. Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325, 329 (1939). Thus, in
the absence of specific international treaties or agreements between nations that govern
the granting of nationality, courts do not invoke international law to determine nationality.
Id. Nationality is a concept of international law in that each nation's nationality laws will be
recognized by other nations to the extent that these laws are consistent with international
nationality customs and principles. See Russell, Dual Nationality in Practice-Some Bizzare
Results, 4 INT'L LAW. 756, 762 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Russell] (citing THE HAGUE CON-
VENTION ON CONFLICT OF NATIONALITY LAWS, art. I (1930)).
Dual nationality may arise at birth if two nations confer citizenship on a person
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thereafter.' Dual nationality causes problems for the dual national's
sovereigns in areas such as taxation,5 military service,' national
security,' and international responsibility for harmful conduct to aliens.8
Dual nationality also causes severe problems for individual dual na-
tionals who are subjected to competing claims by more than one nation.'
The United States has recognized the undesirability of dual nationality,"0
and has attempted to limit the incidence of dual nationality.11 Never-
theless, dual nationality will persist as long as sovereign nations confer
simultaneously. The first nation will confer nationality under the doctrine of jus soli on a
person born within the territorial limits of that nation. The second nation will confer citizen-
ship on the same person under the doctrine of jus sanguinis because the person's ancestors
were citizens of the second nation. See Orfield, supra note 2, at 432-37. When the doctrines
of jus soli and jus sanguinis are used simultaneously, unfortunate results can occur. For ex-
ample, if a married couple who are citizens of country A are on a cruise and stop at a port in
country B, a child born to the couple while they are in country B will acquire the B citizen-
ship if country B follows the doctrine of jus soli See id. at 434. See also Russell, supra note
2, at 757-61. One commentator notes that the war of 1812 was fought because the British im-
pressed naturalized American citizens, who were former British subjects, in the British
military service. The British still considered the naturalized Americans to be British
citizens and subject to military service. Id. at 756.
' A person acquires dual nationality subsequent to birth usually as a result of natural-
ization. For example, a person may become a citizen of the United States by his own natural-
ization, or by the naturalization of his parents. If his original nation of citizenship does not
recognize his expatriation or his renunciation of his original citizenship, the person becomes
a dual national. Sadat v. Mertes, 615 F.2d 1176, 1184 n.10 (7th Cir. 1980) (citing Tomasicchio
v. Acheson, 98 F. Supp. 166, 169 (D.D.C. 1951)); see Orfield, supra note 2, at 437-42; Problems
of Dual Nationality, supra note 2, at 64.
See Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47, 53-56 (1924).
See Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717, 720-34 (1952).
See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 97-99 (1943); Warsoff, Citizenship in
the State of Israel, 33 N.Y.U.L. REV. 857, 860-61 (1958).
' See Sadat v. Mertes, 615 F.2d 1176, 1183-88 (7th Cir. 1980).
' A dual national may be taxed by both his states of citizenship. Both nations may re-
quire the dual national to perform military service. During times of crisis, both nations may
question the dual national's loyalty. During periods of war, the dual national may be forced
to support one nation of citizenship and thus, aggrieve the other. The aggrieved nation may
react by seizing the dual national's property, or finding him guilty of treason. See Orfield,
supra note 2, at 428; A Solution of the Dual Nationality Problem, supra note 1, at 400.
- 10 The United States has officially recognized that dual nationality is undesirable. See
Savorgnan v. United States, 338 U.S. 491, 500 (1950); Sadat v. Mertes, 615 F.2d 1176, 1184
(7th Cir. 1980). Consequently, the Supreme Court's statements in Kawakita v. United
States, 343 U.S. 717, 734 (1952), that appear to approve of dual nationality, have puzzled at
least one commentator. See Note, Expatriating the Dual National, 68 YALE L.J. 1167, 1173
n.38 (1950) [hereinafter cited as Expatriating the Dual National].
" The United States has attempted to limit the incidence of dual nationality through
the expatriation theory. An individual expatriates himself when he completely severs his
relationship with a particular nation. See Problems of Dual Nationality, supra note 2, at 65;
HACKWORTH. supra note 1, §§ 220, 242. Although the common law prohibited expatriation
without the sovereign's prior consent, in 1868 Congress declared that all people have an in-
herent right to expatriate. See Mandoli v. Acheson, 344 U.S. 133, 135 (1952); Savorgnan v.
United States, 338 U.S. 491, 498 (1949). By allowing an individual to voluntarily expatriate,




nationality independently 12 and do not formulate an international system
of granting nationality.' 3
Since dual nationality will continue until an international system of
nationality is created, courts have focused on how to solve the problems
that dual nationality creates." International judicial tribunals have
developed and applied the doctrine of dominant nationality to settle con-
flicts between two or more nations that have a claim upon a dual na-
tional. 5 In Sadat v. Mertes,'8 for the first time in American civil law, the
Seventh Circuit introduced a qualified form of the international doctrine
of dominant nationality.'7 The Sadat court used qualified dominant na-
tionality theory to determine whether an Egyptian/American dual na-
tional could rely on his Egyptian nationality to sue in federal court under
the alienage jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2).8
International judicial tribunals use the doctrine of dominant na-
tionality to determine whether, under international law, a nation that in-
jures a dual national will be responsible for the injurious conduct.19 A na-
The Expatriation Act of 1907 stated that a person lost his American citizenship if he
became a naturalized citizen in a foreign nation, took an oath of allegiance to a foreign na-
tion, or, if the person was a woman, married a foreigner. See 34 Stat. 1228, 8 U.S.C. § 6
(1907). In 1940, Congress expanded the grounds for expatriation in the Nationality Act of
1940. See 54 Stat. 1174, 8 U.S.C. § 1001 (1940). The Nationality Act of 1940 also contained
two provisions addressed specifically to dual nationals. See Expatriating the Dual National,
supra note 10, at 1169 n.11. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 also contains a sec-
tion devoted solely to dual nationals. See 8 U.S.C. § 1482 (1976); Wasserman, The Voluntary
Abandonment of United States Citizenship, 2 Imm. & NAT. L. REV. 537, 539 (1979).
The United States has attempted to limit the incidence of dual nationality by limiting
the application of nationality jus sanguinis. See Expatriating the Dual Nationa4 supra note
10, at 1169 n.11; A Solution of the Dual Nationality Problem, supra note 1, at 400-01. The
United States has also attempted to limit dual nationality by treaty. See Expatriating the
Dual National supra note 10, at 1169 n.11.
II The United States government and domestic courts have recognized that dual na-
tionality will persist. See Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815, 827 (1971); Kawakita v. United
States, 343 U.S. 717, 734 (1952); Sadat v. Mertes, 615 F.2d 1176, 1185 (7th Cir. 1980).
" According to one commentator, the doctrine of jus soli should be the basis of an in-
ternational system of nationality. See Scott, supra note 2, at 64.
1 See notes 5-9 supra.
'5 See text accompanying notes 19-33 infra.
" 615 F.2d 1176 (7th Cir. 1980).
'T See text accompanying notes 34-38 infra.
IS 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (1976). See 615 F.2d at 1184-88; text accompanying notes 42, 70,
71 infra.
"' See, e.g., Merg6 Claim, 22 I.L.R. 443, 450-56 (Italian-American Conciliation Comm'n.
1955); Liechtenstein v. Guatemala (Nottebohn Case), [1955] I.C.J. 4, 22; Drummond's Case,
12 Eng. Rep. 492, 500 (1834).
A nation is responsible under international law for injurious conduct to an alien if the
alien is subject to the jurisdiction of the nation which causes the injury. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 164 (1965) [hereinafter
cited as RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS]. International responsibility for injurious con-
duct to aliens exist to protect individuals who live or travel in foreign nations, and to fur-
ther social and economic relations between nations. See Sohn and Baxter, Responsibility of
States for Injuries to the Economic Interests of Aliens, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 545, 546 (1961).
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tion may, for example, injure a person by seizing his property." If the
person is a citizen of only the injury-causing state, he has no recourse
against the state under international law on the theory of injurious con-
duct against an alien.2' If the person, however, is a dual national, he may
petition his second nation of citizenship to bring a claim in an interna-
tional judicial forum on the theory of injurious conduct against an alien.'
The dual national's second nation of citizenship will allege that the
injury-causing state should treat the dual national as an alien because
the dual national is a citizen of the second nation.' In response, the
injury-causing state will claim the dual national as a citizen and deny
responsibility under international law for injurious conduct against an
alien.2
I See Drummond's Case, 12 Eng. Rep. 492, 496-500 (1834). Drummond was a dual
English/French national. The French government seized his property. Drummond asked the
British government to bring a claim against France under the 1814 Treaty of Paris which
authorized the settlement of claims by British citizens against France. The international
tribunal denied Drummond's claim because Drummond's dominant nationality was French.
The international tribunal stated that the decisive factor was that Drummond was domiciled
in France at the time the claim arose. France, therefore, was merely exercising its authority
over one of its citizens. Id.
According to the American Law Institute, wrongful conduct under international law
includes conduct that is inconsistent with the international standard of justice, or conduct
that violates an international agreement. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS. supra note
19, § 165. The Permanent Court of International Justice and the Permanent Court of Ar-
bitration have both recognized the international standard. Id at § 165 n.1. The Permanent
Court of International Justice stated that the international standard prohibits those actions
against an alien that are wrongful under international law principles. Id.
21 The question of international responsibility for injurious conduct to aliens is
separate and distinct from the question of state treatment of its own citizens under interna-
tional law. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 19, § 165 Comment h. Many
commentators feel that states are bound under international law to respect the basic human
rights of all individuals, whether they are citizens or aliens. Id Although an individual who
is not a dual national cannot bring a claim against his nation on the theory of injurious con-
duct to an alien, the individual is not precluded from seeking relief against his nation based
on a violation of human rights. Cf. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, No. 79-6090, slip op. at 6 (2d Cir.
June 30, 1980) (torture by government official of a citizen violates international law).
See notes 20-21 supra. Although a nation is responsible under international law for
injurious conduct to an alien, see note 19 supra, a nation is generally not responsible for in-
jurious conduct against a dual national, even if the same conduct would make the nation
liable under international law for injurious conduct to an alien. 615 F.2d at 1187; RESTATE-
MENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS. supra note 19, § 171 Comment c. The rationale underlying the
general rule of non-responsibility for injurious conduct to dual nationals is that a foreign
government cannot complain about how another nation treats one of its citizens, even if the
person is a citizen of the foreign nation. 615 F.2d at 1187; see note 25 infra.
I See, e.g., Merg6 Claim, 22 I.L.R. 443, 444-56 (Italian-American Conciliation Comm'n.
1955); Liechtenstein v. Guatemala (Nottebohn Case), [19551 I.C.J. 4, 17-23; Drummond's Case,
12 Eng. Rep. 492, 496-500 (1834). See also Griffin, The Right to a Single Nationality, 40
TEMP. L. Q. 57, 60-64 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Griffin]; Rode, Dual Nationality and the
Doctrine of Dominant Nationality, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 139, 140-43 (1959) [hereinafter cited as
Rode].
" See note 23 supra.
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International judicial tribunals usually settle questions of interna-
tional responsibility that involve dual nationals by invoking the doctrine
of dominant nationality.' Under the doctrine, a court must determine
which of the dual national's citizenships is dominant.2' Although courts
usually determine dominant nationality by focusing on the dual
national's domicile or habitual residence,27 these factors are not control-
ling.' Courts also consider the special circumstances of each case.'
Under international dominant nationality theory, if a dual national's
relationship to the injury-causing state is remote or tenuous, the injury-
causing state should be responsible under international law for injurious
conduct to an alien." If, however, the dual national's relationship to the
injury-causing state is dominant"' over his relationship to his second
state of citizenship, the injury-causing state may treat the dual national
as its own citizen.12 The injury-causing state, consequently, will not be
responsible under international law for injurious conduct against an
alien."
The doctrine of dominant nationality has been qualified to allow a na-
tion, in one important situation, to treat a dual national as a citizen
regardless of his dominant nationality.34 If a nation determines that a
dual national has maintained voluntarily his domestic citizenship,35 even
if the domestic citizenship is not dominant, 6 the domestic nation may
treat the dual national as a citizen." Relying on the voluntary
2 The doctrine of dominant nationality is an exception to the general rule of non-
responsibility under international law for injurious conduct to dual nationals. 615 F.2d at
1187; RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 19, § 171.
See note 23 supra.
Id.; see note 20 supra.
2, 615 F.2d at 1187; Liechtenstein v. Guatamala (Nottebohn Case), [1955] I.C.J. 4, 22.
615 F.2d at 1187; Liechtenstein v. Guatamala (Nottebohn Case), [1955] I.C.J. 4, 22. In
order to determine dominant nationality, the international judicial tribunal may consider
such factors as the dual national's family ties, his participation in public life, his center of in-
terest, his personal attachment for a certain nation, and any other factors that the tribunal
considers important. Liechtenstein v. Guatamala, [1955] I.C.J. at 22.
See note 23 supra.
8, See text accompanying notes 27-29 supra.
See note 23 supra.
"Id.
" The American Law Institute has qualified the doctrine of dominant nationality.
RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 19, § 171(c), Comment e. The RESTATEMENT
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS reflects the opinions of a private organization, and is not an official
United States document. The American Law Institute intended the qualified doctrine of
dominant nationality to operate in an international context. See id. The qualification,
however, is not useful in an international context. See note 81 infra. Although the American
Law Institute did not intend the qualification to enable a domestic court to extract domi-
nant nationality theory from international law and apply the doctrine to a domestic case, the
qualification yields this result. See text accompanying notes 82-90 infra.
I United States courts resolve nationality questions by referring to the Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1952. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1481-1489 (1976).
See text accompanying notes 26-29 supra.
RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS. supra note 19, § 171(c); see 615 F.2d at 1187-88.
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maintenance qualification, the Sadat court extracted the doctrine of
dominant nationality from international law" and applied the doctrine to
a domestic case. 9
In Sadat, an Egyptian/American dual national was involved in an
automobile accident. 0 The dual national brought a negligence action in
federal district court seeking damages for injuries allegedly caused by
the operators of the other vehicle. The plaintiff alleged that the district
court had subject matter jurisdiction under the alienage jurisdiction
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2).41 The alienage jurisdiction statute gives
the federal district courts subject matter jurisdiction in suits between
citizens of the United States, and citizens or subjects of foreign nations."
The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. The court held that a dual national cannot rely on his
foreign nationality to sue in federal court under the alienage jurisdiction
statute.44 On appeal to the Seventh Circuit, the plaintiff alleged that the
district court had jurisdiction because he was a citizen of a foreign state
See note 81 infra.
615 F.2d at 1187-88.
615 F.2d at 1178. The plaintiff in Sadat was born in Egypt and acquired Egyptian
nationality jus soli Id. In 1973, the plaintiff became a naturalized citizen of the United
States with the permission of the Egyptian government. Id
SId. The plaintiff in Sadat alleged that both operators of the other vehicle involved in
the accident were negligent and sought one million dollars in damages. Id. The insurers of
both automobiles involved in the accident were joined as defendants. Id The defendant's
complaint joined the General Casualty Company of Wisconsin as a third-party defendant. Id
At the time the plaintiff filed his complaint, he was residing in Egypt after having left
employment in Lebanon. Id.
42 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (1976); see note 72 infra. In order to determine federal district
court jurisdiction, courts focus on the litigants' status at the time the complaint is filed. 615
F.2d at 1180 (citing Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91, 93 n.1 (1957)). The Sadat plaintiff averred
that at the time he filed the complaint, he was a citizen of Egypt and a citizen of the United
States. 615 F.2d at 1178. The defendants were citizens of Wisconsin and/or Connecticut. Id.
The plaintiff alleged that as an Egyptian citizen, he could sue in federal district court under
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (1976). 615 F.2d at 1178.
The plaintiff also alleged subject matter jurisdiction under diversity of citizenship. 615
F.2d at 1178. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (1976). The federal district courts have subject mat-
ter jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship in suits between citizens of different states
of the United States. 615 F.2d at 1178.
615 F.2d at 1178.
" Id. The district court held that the plaintiff in Sadat failed to meet the diversity re-
quirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) on two grounds. Sadat v. Mertes, 464 F. Supp. 1311,
1313 (E.D. Wis. 1979), affd, 615 F.2d 1176 (7th Cir. 1980). First, the Sadat plaintiff was a
naturalized American citizen who completely renounced his former allegiance to Egypt. Id-
Therefore, even if Egypt did not recognize the renunciation, the plaintiff's waiver of his
Egyptian citizenship controlled the determination of the diversity requirements under 28
U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (1976). 464 F. Supp. at 1313.
Second, the district court noted that a holding which allows a naturalized American
dual national to rely on his foreign citizenship to sue in federal court could provide
naturalized American citizens with almost unlimited access to federal courts. 464 F. Supp.
at 1313. As a result, naturalized American citizens would be in a favored position over
native-born American citizens. Id.; see note 96 infra. The district court concluded that such
a result would defeat the purposes of diversity jurisdiction. 464 F. Supp. at 1313. The
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within the meaning of the alienage jurisdiction statute.45 The Seventh
Circuit affirmed the district court's decision" and held that the plaintiff
was not a citizen of Egypt for the purpose of federal diversity jurisdic-
tion."'
The Sadat court relied on the voluntary maintenance qualification of
the doctrine of dominant nationality48 to determine whether the plaintiff
was a citizen of a foreign nation within the meaning of the alienage juris-
diction statute. Initially, the court noted that an American dual national
with a dominant foreign nationality met the diversity requirements of 28
U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2).49 Nevertheless, the court concluded that although the
plaintiff was domiciled in Egypt at the time he filed his complaint,"0 the
plaintiff's dominant nationality was not Egyptian."
The Sadat court focused on the plaintiff's actions subsequent to his
naturalization as an American citizen and concluded that the plaintiff's
Egyptian nationality was not dominant.2 The court noted that the plain-
tiff swore his sole allegiance to the United States,' renounced his
foreign citizenship,s' did not obtain employment in Egypt that could have
jeopardized his American citizenship," voted in the 1976 presidential
election,5 and registered with the United States Embassy while in
district court, however, did not discuss the purposes of diversity jurisdiction in this context.
See id
The district court further held that the plaintiff was domiciled in Egypt at the time he
filed the complaint. Id. Therefore, the plaintiff was not a citizen of an American state at the
time he filed the complaint and consequently, the district court did not have subject matter
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (1976). 464 F. Supp. at 1313.
11 615 F.2d at 1178. In addition to alleging jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2)
(1976), the Sadat plaintiff's appeal to the Seventh Circuit challenged the district court's
holding that the plaintiff was not a citizen of a state and therefore, could not sue under 28
U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (1976). 615 F.2d at 1178; see note 44 supra. The plaintiff also alleged that
the defendants should be estopped from raising a subject matter jurisdiction objection
because the statute of limitations had run on the plaintiff's cause of action. 615 F.2d at 1188.
If the Seventh Circuit had sustained any of the plaintiff's challenges, the district court's
judgment would have been reversed. Id at 1177.
615 F.2d at 1182-88.
M' Id.; see text accompanying notes 47-59 infra.
See text accompanying notes 34-38 supra.
' 615 F.2d at 1187. The Sadat court recognized the general rule of non-responsibility
under international law for injuries to dual nationals. Id; see note 22 supra. The court fur-
ther recognized that the doctrine of dominant nationality is an exception to the general rule
of non-responsibility. 615 F.2d at 1187; see note 25 supra.
See text accompanying notes 27-29 supra.
5' 615 F.2d at 1187; see text accompanying notes 98-103 infra.
615 F.2d at 1188.
SId.; see 8 U.S.C. § 1448(a)(1) (1976).
615 F.2d at 1188; see 8 U.S.C. § 1448(a)(2) (1976).
615 F.2d at 1188. A naturalized, or native-born American citizen, loses his American
citizenship if he accepts, serves in, or performs the duties of any government position, or of-
fice of a foreign state of which he is a citizen. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(4)(A) (1976).
1 615 F.2d at 1188. A naturalized or native-born American citizen loses his American
citizenship if he votes in a political election in a foreign country. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(5) (1976).
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Egypt." The Sadat court interpreted the plaintiff's actions as demon-
strating his intent to maintain voluntarily his American citizenship.,
The court, therefore, treated the plaintiff as an American citizen for the
purpose of determining whether he could sue in federal district court
under the alienage jurisdiction statute0 and barred him from obtaining a
federal forum."
Although the Sadat court's decision to bar the plaintiff from suing in
federal court was correct, the court's reasoning was incomplete. The
court never explained why the unqualified international doctrine of
dominant nationality was not applicable in Sadat.61 The court, moreover,
did not explain how the qualified form of the doctrine of dominant na-
tionality provides a flexible method of solving dual nationality problems
that is consistent with the policies underlying alienage jurisdiction."2
The Sadat court's decision not to apply unqualified international
dominant nationality theory" was correct. The doctrine of dominant na-
tionality in international law is a bilateral concept designed to accom-
modate the interests of more than one nation. 4 The nations involved in
an international dispute, consequently, agree to be bound by the interna-
tional judicial tribunal's decision.65 The Egyptian government was not in-
volved in Sadat." Therefore, the bilateral setting in which the doctrine
5 615 F.2d at 1188.
a i
5' See text accompanying note 42 supra; text accompanying note 72 infra.
615 F.2d at 1188. The Sadat court, in addition to barring the plaintiff from bringing
suit in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2), see text accompanying notes 48-58 supra,
also barred the plaintiff from suing in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). See notes 42
& 44 supra. Section 1332(a)(1) requires that an individual be both a citizen of the United
States, and a citizen of a state within the United States. 615 F.2d at 1182. The Sadat court
affirmed the district court's ruling that the plaintiff was domiciled in Egypt at the time he
filed his complaint and therefore, was not a citizen of a state as required by 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a)(1). Id at 1180-82. The Sadat court also dismissed the plaintiff's claim that the defen-
dants could not raise a subject matter jurisdiction objection because the statute of limita-
tions had run on the plaintiff's cause of action. IM at 1188. The court stated that federal sub-
ject matter jurisdiction which does not exist cannot be invoked by estoppel, and that an ob-
jection to subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceeding. Id.
" See text accompanying notes 63-81 infra.
See text accompanying notes 82-96 infra.
See text accompanying notes 19-32 supra.
See note 23 supra. International judicial tribunals often use dominant nationality
theory as a result of a treaty or agreement between two or more nations. Certain treaties
authorize the nations party to the treaty to provide for a tribunal and to hear the claims.
See, e.g., Merg6 Claim 22 I.L.R. 443, 445-48 (Italian-American Conciliation Comm'n. 1955)
(1947 peace treaty with Italy authorized settlement of nationality conflicts); Drummond's
Case, 12 Eng. Rep. 492, 494 (1834) (1814 Treaty of Paris authorized the settlement of dual
national's claims). In the absence of an applicable treaty, the International Court of Justice
may have jurisdiction. See Liechtenstein v. Guatamala (Nottebohn Case), [1953] I.C.J. 4, 4-5
In both situations, the international judicial tribunal has the cooperation and participation
of both nations involved in the nationality dispute.
" See 615 F.2d at 1182-88.
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of dominant nationality was intended to operate did not exist." Interna-
tional dominant nationality theory was also inapplicable in Sadat
because the doctrine's purpose is to determine whether a nation should
be responsible under international law for injurious conduct against an
alien. 8 In Sadat, the court faced a question of domestic federal court
jurisdiction that included a nationality problem. 9 The Sadat court did
not face the issue of international responsibility.0
Unqualified international dominant nationality theory is also incon-
sistent with the policies underlying alienage jurisdiction."' Alienage
jurisdiction exists so that the United States will not offend foreign
governments by forcing foreign citizens to litigate in our state courts.
72
In order to apply international dominant nationality theory, a federal
court must independently and unilaterally determine the relative
dominance of a foreign citizen's foreign and domestic nationalities." In
comparison, international dominant nationality theory is applicable in
international disputes between two nations because both nations par-
", Id. A domestic court could apply international dominant nationality theory in certain
domestic cases when the interests of two or more jurisdictions are involved and thus, a
bilateral setting exists. In a citizenship conflict between two American states, or between a
state and the federal government, two jurisdictions would be directly involved. In such a
situation, a court could apply international dominant nationality theory because the
bilateral setting in which the doctrine was made to operate would exist. For example,
American courts have applied international continental shelf theories to appropriate
domestic cases where a bilateral setting existed. See United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707,
710-15 (1950); United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699, 702-06 (1950); United States v.
California, 332 U.S. 19, 22-25 (1947).
See text accompanying notes 19-33 supra.
615 F.2d at 1184-88.
70 Id.
" See text accompanying note 72 infra.
Diversity jurisdiction, which is available to citizens of different states, is based on
the highly criticized belief that the state court system operates prejudicially against out-of-
state litigants. 615 F.2d at 1182; see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (1976). Although alienage jurisdic-
tion is based on similar fears, these fears are the result of more realistic concerns. 615 F.2d
at 1182. Alienage jurisdiction is apparently based upon the absence of treaties between
states within the United States, and foreign nations concerning the treatment and protec-
tion of foreigners, and the fear of offending foreign nations by forcing their citizens to
litigate in a forum that is not national. 615 F.2d at 1182 (citing Blair Holdings Corp. v.
Rubinstein, 133 F. Supp. 496, 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1955)); see note 96 infra.
I In Sadat, the Seventh Circuit focused on the plaintiffs actions subsequent to his
naturalization as an American citizen, see text accompanying notes 52-58 supra, to deter-
mine the plaintiffs dominant nationality. 615 F.2d at 1187-88; see text accompanying notes
99-105 infra. The court did not rely on domicile even though the majority of courts have
used domicile or habitual residence to determine dominant nationality. 615 F.2d at 1187-88;
see text accompanying notes 27-29 supra. Therefore, Sadat illustrates how a domestic court
can unilaterally determine dominant nationality without taking into account what the dual
national's second nation of citizenship considers important in determining dominant na-
tionality. In an international setting, however, both nations involved can present to the in-
ternational judicial tribunal what each considers important in determining dominant na-
tionality. See text accompanying notes 19-24 supra.
1981]
86 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
ticipate in the court's determination of dominant nationality and both na-
tions agree to follow the international judicial tribunal's decision." A
domestic dispute normally does not involve a foreign government. In
Sadat, for example, the Egyptian government did not participate in the
Seventh Circuit's determination of dominant nationality, 5 and did not
agree to be bound by the court's decision. 8 The Sadat court, therefore,
could have offended the Egyptian government merely by using the inter-
national doctrine of dominant nationality. The court's determination of
the plaintiff's dominant nationality, furthermore, could have offended
the Egyptian government because the Seventh Circuit's decision affects
an Egyptian citizen. Moreover, if a domestic court were to determine
that a dual national's dominant nationality is domestic, the domestic
court's decision means that the domestic nation cannot be held responsi-
ble under international law for injurious conduct to an alien.7 Since in-
ternational judicial tribunals should determine international respon-
sibility, the domestic court's dominant nationality determination may
offend a foreign government. The Sadat court, therefore, correctly chose
not to apply the unqualified form of the international doctrine of domi-
nant nationality."
The Sadat court properly applied the voluntary maintenance qualifi-
cation of dominant nationality theory."0 The qualified rule is applicable to
dual nationality questions within a domestic jurisdiction8' and is consis-
7' See text accompanying notes 19-33 supra.
See 615 F.2d at 1187-88.
78 Id.
See text accompanying notes 19-24 supra.
s A state can claim international responsibility for injurious conduct against an alien if
the alien is a national of that state. See RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra
note 19, § 174. Therefore, when the dual national is a citizen of the injury-causing state, the
injury-causing state can claim responsibility under international law for the injurious con-
duct. See id. Nevertheless, the injury-causing state cannot effectively deny international
responsibility because the dual national's second state of citizenship could bring a claim
against the injury-causing state in an international judicial forum. See id; note 65 supra.
"9 At least one commentator has stated that international dominant nationality theory
is not applicable to dual nationality questions in domestic courts. See Rode, supra note 23, at
144-45.
International law is a part of American law. Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 72-73
(1941); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). An American court, however, should
only apply international law when the prescribed law is appropriate. 313 U.S. at 73; 175 U.S.
at 700. The Sadat court, therefore, properly refused to apply unqualified international domi-
nant nationality theory. The Sadat court appropriately modified the bilateral international
doctrine to apply to a unilateral domestic case. See text accompanying notes 82-109 infra.
o See text accompanying notes 34-39 supra.
SI The qualified rule of dominant nationality theory is applicable to dual nationality
questions within a domestic jurisdiction. See text accompanying notes 84-90 infra. However,
the qualified rule may be less useful in an international setting. In an international dual na-
tionality case, the international judicial tribunal considers the question of international
responsibility for injurious conduct to an alien. See text accompanying notes 19-33 supra.
The international tribunal must decide the dual national's dominant nationality to resolve
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tent with the international comity policy underlying alienage jurisdic-
tion 2 A domestic court can use the qualified rule because the court can
solve the dual nationality problem unilaterally by referring to domestic
nationality law." In a domestic dispute, the qualified rule yields two
possible results that depend on whether the dual national has maintained
voluntarily his domestic citizenship. If a nation determines that the dual
national has maintained voluntarily his citizenship, the nation does not
have to determine the dual national's dominant nationality,84 and may
treat him as a citizen. A foreign government should not be offended by
the domestic court's decision in this situation because the dual national's
voluntary maintenance of his domestic nationality would be the con-
clusive factor. Since the policy behind alienage jurisdiction is to avoid of-
fending foreign governments, 5 the qualified rule yields one result that is
consistent with this policy.
If, on the other hand, the domestic court determines that the dual
national did not maintain voluntarily his domestic nationality, the dual
national's foreign nationality probably would be dominant. As a result,
the domestic court would treat the dual national as an alien for the pur-
poses of federal jurisdiction. A domestic court's treatment of a dual na-
tional as an alien should not offend a foreign government because such
treatment implies that the domestic nation is responsible under interna-
tional law for injurious conduct to the alien. 7 Therefore, whether or not
the domestic court determines that the dual national maintained volun-
tarily his citizenship, the court's determination is consistent with the
policies underlying alienage jurisdiction."
the problem because one nation will not agree to let another nation treat the dual national
solely as a citizen, and thereby avoid international responsibility for injurious conduct to an
alien. See text accompanying notes 19-24 supra. If an international tribunal used the
qualified rule, a nation could escape international responsibility by determining that the
dual national maintained voluntarily his domestic citizenship under that nation's domestic
nationality laws. See text accompanying notes 34-39 supra. Nevertheless, the second nation
involved could protest because the international court would have made the decision by
referring to the other nation's domestic nationality law instead of referring to international
standards of dominant nationality. Therefore, the international court would have to resolve
the protest by deterihining dominant nationality based on international criteria, and not by
relying on the other nation's domestic nationality law. In such a case the use of the qualifica-
tion would not determine the outcome of the case. The international court may, however,
use the dual national's voluntary maintenance of one nationality as a factor in its determina-
tion of dominant nationality. See text accompanying notes 27-29 supra. Consequently, unless
the two nations involved have specifically agreed to use the qualified rule, see note 65
supra, the qualification may not be determinative in an international dominant nationality
case.
82 See text accompanying notes 70-71 supra.
See note 35 supra.
U See text accompanying notes 34-49 supra.
See text accompanying notes 70-71 supra.
See text accompanying notes 34-49 supra.
Id.
"See text accompanying notes 70-71 supra.
1981]
88 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
The Sadat court could have relied upon prior precedent89 to apply a
rigid rule that treats all dual nationals as American citizens for federal
jurisdictional purposes." The rigid rule is appealing because of its
simplicity and predictability." Arguably, the voluntary maintenance
qualification of dominant nationality theory is too complex to apply,92
and treats the dual national as an American citizen in the vast majority
of cases." The Sadat court, however, recognized that the rigid rule is in-
Although the Sadat court was the first circuit court to face the question of whether
a dual national can use his foreign nationality to sue in federal district court under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(a)(2) (1976), two district courts, other than the district court in Sadat, have reached
contrary results on the same question. In Aguirre v. Nagel, 270 F. Supp. 535 (E.D. Mich.
1967), the court allowed the dual national plaintiff to sue in federal district court under 28
U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) because the plaintiff was a Mexican citizen jus sanguinis, even though she
was an American citizen jus soli. 270 F. Supp. at 536; see notes 2-4 supra. The plaintiff could
not sue under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) because she resided in the same state as the defendant.
270 F. Supp. at 535. The Aguirre court reasoned that the plaintiff's situation fell within the
exact language of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2). 270 F. Supp. at 536. In addition, the court noted that
the absence of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) should not preclude jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2). 270 F. Supp. at 536.
The Seventh Circuit in Sadat criticized the Aguirre decision and indicated that the
Aguirre court applied 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) literally, and completely ignored the policies
underlying alienage jurisdiction. 615 F.2d at 1185-86; see note 72 supra. The district court in
Raphael v. Hertzberg, 470 F. Supp. 984(c.D. Cal. 1979), criticized the Aguirre decision on
multiple grounds. The Raphael court indicated that the Augirre court violated the require-
ment of complete diversity because both the plaintiff and the defendant were citizens of the
same state. Id. at 986 (citing Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 270 (1806)). The
Raphael court also noted that the litigants would not be subjected to bias in state court
because both litigants were citizens of the same state. 470 F. Supp. at 985. The Raphael
court added that a foreign nation would not be offended if the plaintiff was relegated to
state court because the plaintiff was an American citizen. Id. The court also indicated that
the Aguirre decision favors naturalized citizens over native-born citizens by allowing
naturalized citizens almost unlimited access to federal courts. Id see note 96 infra. The
Raphael court concluded that extending the coverage of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) to allow the
plaintiff to sue in federal court would not be wise in light of the increasing criticism of the
concept of diversity jurisdiction. 470 F. Supp. at 985. But see note 96 infra. Therefore, the
Raphael court stated a rigid rule that treats dual nationals as American citizens for federal
jurisdictional purposes. 470 F. Supp. at 986. The district court in Sadat reached the same
conclusion as the Raphael court. Sadat v. Mertes, 464 F. Supp. 1311, 1313-14 (E.D. Wis.
1979), affd, 615 F.2d 1176 (7th Cir. 1980).
" See note 91 infra. The Sadat court acknowledged that at least one commentator
would treat all dual nationals as American citizens for federal jurisdictional purposes. 615
F.2d at 1187 (citing Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute, 36 U. CHI.
L. REv. 1, 10 n.50 (1968)). The rigid rule that requires courts to treat all dual nationals as
American citizens for federal jurisdictional purposes is based on the idea that a foreign
government will rarely become offended if the United States treats American dual nationals
as American citizens. Id. But see text accompanying note 95 infra.
" See Currie, The Federal Courts and the America Law Institute, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 1,
10 n.50 (1968).
See text accompanying note 103 infra.
The Sadat court acknowledged that in the majority of cases an American court will




consistent with the policy of international comity that underlies alienage
jurisdiction9 since forcing a dual national to litigate in state court may
offend a foreign government. 5 Although the rigid rule requires courts to
treat the dual national as an American citizen in all cases, the qualified
rule of dominant nationality theory is flexible. The qualified rule also
promotes judicial economy because a court using the rule will invoke
federal jurisdiction in a manner consistent with the policy underlying
alienage jurisdiction.96
Although the qualified rule is vastly different from the unqualified
international dominant nationality theory,97 the qualified rule is an ex-
cellent tool for determining whether a dual national should be allowed to
See text accompanying notes 70-71 supra.
Although the Sadat court acknowledged that in most cases a foreign government
will not be offended when an American court treats an American dual national as an
American citizen for jurisdictional purposes, see text accompanying note 94 supra, the
Sadat court was obviously concerned with those cases where an American court should
allow an American dual national to obtain a federal forum. 615 F.2d at 1186. Therefore, the
Sadat court chose to set a precedent that allows a court to treat an American dual national
as a foreign citizen for federal jurisdictional purposes when such treatment is necessary to
effectuate the international comity policy underlying alienage jurisdiction. 615 F.2d at
1187-88; see text accompanying notes 70-71 supra.
Although the Sadat court rejected the rigid rule that treats all American dual na-
tionals as American citizens for federal jurisdictional purposes, the Sadat court also re-
jected a precedent that would allow American dual nationals almost unlimited access to
federal district courts. 615 F.2d at 1187-88; see note 44 supra. In Sadat, the plaintiff was an
American/Egyptian dual national who resided in Egypt at the time he filed his complaint in
federal court. 615 F.2d at 1178-80. The plaintiff in Sadat could not sue in federal district
court under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) because he was not a citizen of an American state. See
notes 44 & 60 supra. Therefore, the plaintiff attempted to sue in federal court under 28
U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2). See text accompanying notes 40-47 supra. Nevertheless, a similarly
situated native-born American could not sue under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) because he would
not be a citizen of a state. See notes 44 & 60 supra. Furthermore, the native-born American
could not sue under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) because he would not be a dual national and,
therefore, could not rely on a foreign citizenship. If the Sadat court had allowed the plaintiff
to sue in federal district court under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2), the court would have set a prece-
dent affording naturalized American dual nationals almost unlimited access to federal
courts. Such a precedent would favor naturalized Americans over native-born Americans.
The Sadat court obviously agreed with the Raphael court that the policies underlying
allenage jurisdiction do not support such a result. See note 91 supra. Nevertheless, the
Raphael court incorrectly concluded that this result would expand diversity jurisdiction in
light of the increasing criticism of the concept of diversity citizenship. See 470 F. Supp. at
986. Alienage jurisdiction is not attacked by those commentators who criticize diversity
jurisdiction. See Rowe, Abolishing Diversity Jurisdiction: Positive Side Effects and Poten-
tial for Further Reforms, 92 HARv. L. REV. 963, 967-68 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Rowe];
Shapiro, Federal Diversity Jurisdiction.. A Survey and a Proposal, 91 HARv. L. REV. 317,
347-50 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Shapiro]. Therefore, even the commentators who advocate
eliminating diversity jurisdiction in suits between citizens of different states recognize that
alienage jurisdiction should be retained because alienage jurisdiction maintains interna-
tional comity and does not burden the federal dockets. See 615 F.2d at 1182-83; Rowe, at
967-68; Shapiro, at 347-50.
1 See note 83 supra.
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enter federal court under the alienage jurisdiction statute. The Sadat
opinion, however, failed to consider the procedural problems that the
qualified rule creates. 8 Consequently, the Sadat court erred by deter-
mining the plaintiff's dominant nationality.
The Sadat court held that the plaintiff's dominant nationality was
not Egyptian.9 Under the qualified rule of dominant nationality theory, a
nation may treat a dual national as a citizen if that nation determines
that the dual national maintained voluntarily his citizenship."9 ' The
Sadat court determined that the plaintiff had maintained voluntarily his
American citizenship.' ° The court, therefore, did not have to determine
which of the plaintiff's nationalities was dominant."'2 By determining the
plaintiff's dominant nationality, the Sadat court could have offended the
Egyptian government, and thereby have violated the policy underlying
alienage jurisdiction.113 In addition to violating the international comity
policy underlying alienage jurisdiction, 4 a domestic court that deter-
mines a dual national's dominant nationality when such a determination
is inappropriate is actually applying unqualified international dominant
nationality theory, which is not applicable in a domestic case."'
Domestic courts that rely on the qualified rule, therefore, should
follow a strict format. First, the court should determine whether the
dual national has maintained voluntarily his citizenship."' If the dual na-
" The Sadat court erred by attempting to determine the plaintiffs dominant nationali-
ty. See text accompanying notes 99-103 infra. The Sadat court also erred by stating that the
plaintiffs dominant nationality was not Egyptian. The Seventh Circuit did not state that
the plaintiff's dominant nationality was American. 615 F.2d at 1187-88. Courts have used
dominant nationality theory exclusively to determine which of a dual national's citizenships
is dominant. See note 23 supra. If a court cannot state that one of the dual nationals' citizen-
ships is dominant, the doctrine of dominant nationality should not be used to resolve the
case. See text accompanying notes 19-33 supra. Therefore, a court should either state that
one of the dual national's citizenships is dominant, or state that since neither is dominant,
the theory of dominant nationality cannot determine the outcome of the case.
Two possible explanations exist as to why the Sadat court stated that the plaintiffs
dominant nationality was not Egyptian. First, the Sadat court may have been trying to il-
lustrate how the qualified rule of dominant nationality theory can apply even if the dual na-
tional's dominant nationality is unascertainable. See text accompanying notes 34-38 supra.
Since the qualified rule allows a domestic court to treat the dual national as a citizen if he
has maintained voluntarily his domestic citizenship, the qualified rule applies even if the
plaintiffs dominant nationality is foreign, or cannot be determined. Id Second, the Sadat
court could have been attempting to reinforce the decision to treat the plaintiff as an
American citizen for federal jurisdictional purposes by showing that the plaintiff's dominant
nationality was not Egyptian.
615 F.2d at 1187-88.
'® See text accompanying notes 34-38 supra.
615 F.2d at 1188.
' See text accompanying notes 34-38 supra.
"' See text accompanying notes 64-81 supra.
104 Id.
"' See text accompanying notes 63-70 supra.
"o See text accompanying notes 34-38 supra.
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tional has maintained voluntarily his domestic citizenship, the court may
treat the dual national as a citizen for purposes of federal jurisdiction."
If the domestic court determines that the dual national did not maintain
voluntarily his domestic citizenship, the court should determine the dual
national's dominant nationality." 8 If the dual national's dominant na-
tionality is foreign,' the court should treat the dual national as an alien
for purposes of federal jurisdiction."' If, however, the court determines
that the dual national's dominant nationality is domestic, the court
should then decide whether treating the dual national as a citizen will of-
fend the dual national's foreign government.1 If allowing the dual na-
tional access to a federal forum would effectuate the international
comity policy which underlies alienage jurisdiction, the court should
treat the dual national as an alien."' However, if relegation of the dual
national to state court would not offend the foreign government, the
court should treat the dual national as a citizen.'
The Sadat court properly applied the qualified rule of dominant na-
tionality theory instead of the international doctrine of dominant na-
tionality. The qualified rule is flexible and allows the court to render
decisions that are consistent with the policies underlying alienage juris-
diction. The qualified rule, when properly applied, is simple to use and is




Il See text accompanying notes 30-33 supra.
110 Id
Ill See text accompanying notes 64-103 supra.
.. See text accompanying notes 70-71 supra.
113 Id
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